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I. INTRODUCTION
"Baseball has been the national pastime for over one hundred years and
enjoys a unique place in our American heritage. The game is on higher ground;
it behooves every one to keep it there."1 Baseball occupies a special place in
American society. Founded by Abner Doubleday in Cooperstown, New York,
in 1839, the game of baseball has evolved and engrossed the hearts and souls
of every American. The game is an integral part of our heritage.
With every new season, baseball fills the hearts and dreams of millions of
fans. Spring training camps open and ballplayers migrate to the warmer
climates of Florida and Arizona for the annual ritual of spring training. It is the
first harbinger of spring. Baseball then keeps the fans' hearts and hopes riveted
1Flood v. Kuhn, 309 F. Supp. 793,797 (S.D. N.Y. 1970). Judge Cooper also stated that
"[M]ajor league professional baseball is avidly followed by millions of fans, looked upon
with fervor and pride and provides a special source of inspiration and competitive team
spirit especially for the young. Baseball's status in the life of the nation is so pervasive
that it would not strain credulity to say the Court can take judicial notice that baseball
is everybody's business." Id.
1Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1995
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
to the grand old game until the final pitch of the World Series in October. Due
to a labor dispute of gigantic proportions in the summer of 1994, the owners
were forced to cancel the World Series for the first time since 1904.2 This strike
did something that two world wars and one massive earthquake could not. It
forced the cancellation of the fall classic. This labor dispute resulted in the
players walking out and beginning their strike on August 12, 1994, in protest
of the owners' proposed salary cap.
This labor dispute and the subsequent players' strike cost both the owners
and the players tremendous amounts of money. The owners reportedly missed
out on an estimated $500 to $600 million in potential revenues, while the
players lost about $230 million in would-be income.3 The biggest losers of the
strike, however, were the fans and the game itself. The fans had one of the most
exciting seasons in recent memory stripped from them in the midst of several
pennant races and the possibility that several long standing records could fall.4
The baseball strike was especially painful and frustrating for the fans of the
Cleveland Indians, who were in contention for their first division title since
1954.
Baseball has also enjoyed a special place in the hearts of Supreme Court
Justices since 1922, when Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes stated, in Federal
Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, that
baseball was not interstate commerce, and therefore, not subject to the antitrust
laws created under the Sherman Act.5 The Supreme Court later upheld this
special exemption in two subsequent decisions.6 Although Toolson v. New York
Yankees and Flood v. Kuhn have questioned the correctness of Federal Baseball,
baseball's exemption from the antitrust laws has survived for seventy-four
years.
2141 CONG. REc. 176 S15, 176 (daily ed. Jan. 4, 1995).
3 Mark Maske, Baseball Stops Playing Games but It's Business as Usual, WASHINGTON
POST, Jan. 8, 1995, at D4. Major League owners claim that an industry which turned a
$50 million profit in 1993 was projecting a $47 million loss in an uninterrupted 1994
season. Id. However, the season was interrupted on August 11, 1994, and later cancelled
altogether, due to the labor dispute.
4 Ken Griffey Jr. of the Seattle Mariners and Matt Williams of the San Francisco
Giants were in pursuit of Roger Maris' home run record (61) that was set in 1961. Tony
Gwynn of the San Diego Padres was attempting to be the first player to hit over .400 for
an entire season since Ted Williams accomplished the feat in 1941.
5259 U.S. 200 (1922).
6 Toolson v. New York Yankees, 346 U.S. 356 (1953); Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258
(1972). The Flood opinion begins by demonstrating Justice Blackmun's great passion for
the game of baseball and its history. He started with a lengthy introduction of the game
and an extensive list of former baseball players including Ty Cobb, Babe Ruth, and Lou
Gehrig. Flood, 407 U.S. at 262.
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Currently, baseball is the only professional sport that enjoys an exemption
from the provisions of the Sherman Act.7 Athletes in other sports are able to
bring antitrust actions against the owners and the league to recover any
damages resulting from antitrust behavior on the part of the owners or the
league.8 Baseball, however, has been granted a special exemption that has been
held not to apply to other professional sports.9 This ability to bring antitrust
suits against the league provides other professional athletes an additional
advantage at the bargaining table because those players have the protection of
the federal antitrust laws and can sue for violations.
This exemption allowed baseball to flourish without being subjected to the
provisions of the antitrust laws that apply to other industries. In the
seventy-four years since the Federal Baseball decision, baseball has evolved into
an enormous industry.10 Baseball's actions in restraining player movement and
in prohibiting teams from moving from city to city have not come under attack,
and have allowed baseball a certain degree of stability.11 The stated reasons and
need for the exemption are many. In baseball's early years, the owners needed
the exemption to prevent the mass player movement and spiraling salaries that
threatened the security of the game. Congress, in a 1952 House Report, stated
that "[b]aseball's history shows that chaotic conditions prevailed when there
was no reserve clause."12 Owners also argue that this exemption is needed to
7The other professional sports have been held subject to the provisions of the
Sherman Act and have not enjoyed the exemption that has been afforded to baseball.
See, Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957) (football); United States
v. International Boxing Club of New York, Inc., 348 U.S. 236 (1955) (boxing); Gunter
Harz Sports, Inc. v. United States Tennis Ass'n., 665 F.2d 222 (8th Cir. 1981) (tennis);
Blalock v. Ladies Professional Golf Ass'n, 359 F. Supp. 1260 (N.D. Ga. 1973) (golf);
Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp.
462 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (hockey); Washington Professional Basketball Corp. v. National
Basketball Ass'n, 147 F. Supp. 154 (S.D. N.Y. 1956) (basketball).
81d.
9Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445,452 (1957). The Radovich Court
discussed the exemption created for baseball in Federal Baseball and Toolson and stated,
"we now specifically limit the rule there established to facts there involved, i.e., the
business of organized professional baseball." Id. The baseball exemption rests on prior
decisions and football has never been afforded the exemption. Id.
1OMaske, supra note 3, at D4. Baseball is currently a $2 billion-a-year industry. Id. A
group of investors led by labor lawyer Peter Angelos recently purchased the Baltimore
Orioles franchise for a record $173 million. Id.
11With the exception of the three challenges to the reserve clause in the Supreme
Court. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972); Toolson v. New York Yankees, 346 U.S.
356 (1953); Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Professional
Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
12Flood, 407 U.S. at 272, citing STUDY OF MONOPOLY POWER OF THE HOUSE COMMIIEE
ON THE JUDICIARY, H.R. Rep. No. 2002, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 229 (1952). The report
concluded that the evidence established baseball's need for some sort of reserve clause
to insure the financial stability and continuing vitality of the league. Id.
1995]
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support the minor league system and to allow Major League Baseball to control
the movement of teams.13 Allowing franchises to move to new cities every
couple of years would harm the stability and integrity of the game.
The baseball owners and the players' wuion have a long and dubious history
of extreme labor disputes since the formation of the union during the 1960's. 14
Baseball has experienced eight work stoppages over the last two decades, and
the last seven times the players and owners have met at the bargaining table a
strike or a lock-out resulted. This accounted for more work stoppages than in
all the other professional sports combined.15
The owners state that the dispute centers on a $2 billion a year industry
facing rising players' salaries that threaten to turn small-market teams into
non-competitive, unstable franchises. 16 The owners claim that baseball turned
a $50 million profit in 1993, but faced a $47 million loss in the uninterrupted
1994 season.17 The owners now seek to tie player compensation to industry
revenues through a salary cap to control their labor costs. In turn, the players
want a free market for their services without the restraints a salary cap creates. 18
After failing to reach a collective bargaining agreement, the owners unilaterally
imposed their new economic system, including the salary cap, on December
23, 1994.19 The owners removed the salary cap on February 3, 1995, and
admitted that an impasse in bargaining did not occur. The owners then
proposed a luxury tax on teams' payrolls. 20 Teams would be forced to pay a
tax on each dollar of their payroll that exceeds the average.
Both sides filed numerous unfair labor practice charges with the National
Labor Relations Board. The strike finally came to an end on March 31, 1995
13 Jim Bunning, Bunning Takes Mound Against Baseball, THE PLAIN DEALER, Oct. 4,1994,
at B7. Jim Bunning is a former Major League player and is now a Republican
Congressman from Kentucky. Congressman Bunning has been outspoken on his
position of wanting Congress to remove baseball's exemption.
14 SeeJOHN HEYLAR, THE LORDS OF THE REALM, THE REAL HISTORY OF BASEBALL (1994),
for an intensive analysis of the relations between the owners and the players in the
twentieth century. The book traces the history of the restraints imposed by the owners
(The Lords) and the rise and development of the players' union headed by Marvin
Miller.
15141 CoNG. REC. S15,176 (daily ed. Jan. 4,1995).
16 See Maske, supra note 3, at D4. The owners' salary cap provides that players will
receive at least fifty percent of league revenues, payrolls cannot exceed the average by
more than 110% and cannot be less than 84% of the average. Tracy Ringolsby, Playing a
Whole New Ballgame, ROCKY MouNTAIN NEws, December 24,1994, at lB. The owners will
implement the plan over four years, and teams that exceed the cap in 1994 must cut their
payroll excess by twenty-five each year. Id.
17See Maske, supra note 3, at D4.
181d.
19 Congress Looks At Antitrust Bill, THE HOUSTON POST, Jan. 6,1995, at B3.
20Hall Bodley, Owner's Offer New Axes Cap, USA TODAY, Feb. 2,1995, at Cl.
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when United States District Court Judge Sonia Sotomayor issued an injunction
that restored the provisions of the expired collective bargaining agreement.
21
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied the owners'
request to stay the injunction and later affirmed the lower court's decision.22
This injunction cleared the way for baseball to resume and begin the 1995
season on April 26, 1995.23 After the issuance of the injunction, the players
offered to return to the field under the terms of the expired collective bargaining
agreement and the owners accepted their offer.24
This note will describe the creation and development of the antitrust
exemption granted to Major League Baseball and the continuing vitality of that
exemption with respect to labor relations. Part I will detail the creation of the
antitrust exemption, the tests articulated by the Supreme Court to determine
whether a particular industry violates the antitrust laws, an application of those
tests to baseball, and the possibility of finally removing this exemption through
legislation in order to bring the law for the industry of baseball into line with
other industries. Part II will discuss how the antitrust laws and labor laws clash
with one another and what effects a removal of the exemption would have on
the negotiations and future collective bargaining agreements between the
owners and players. The discussion will proceed by examining professional
basketball and football and their labor disputes, court decisions concerning
their activities, and what these decisions mean to baseball. This note will not
propose a way to settle the current dispute or to prevent future disputes, but
analyze the rights of the two concerned parties and how the courts will likely
treat the situation.
II. THE CREATION OF BASEBALL'S ANTITRUST EXEMPTION
A. Sherman Act
Congress enacted the Sherman Act in 189025 to prevent any unreasonable
restraints on trade and to promote competition. 26 The Act contains two
provisions which would restrict the behavior of baseball owners, commonly
referred to as Sherman I and Sherman 11.27 Sherman I states that "every contract,
2 1Silverman ex rel. NLRB, 880 F. Supp. 246 (S.D. N.Y. 1995), affd 67 F.3d 1054 (2d Cir.
1995).
2 2Silverman ex rel. NLRB, 67 F.3d 1054 (2d Cir. 1995).
23 Mark Maske, Baseball Strike Ends; Season Opens April 26, WASHINGTON POST, Apr.
3, 1995, at Al.
24Id.
2515 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988).
26 See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Solar Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 635 (1985).
27 Latour ReyLafferty, The Tampa Bay Giants and the Continuing Vitality of Major League
Baseball's Antitrust Exemption: A Review of Piazza v. Major League Baseball, 21 FLA. ST. U.
L. REv. 1271,1273 (1994).
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combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade
or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to
be illegal."28 Sherman II states that every person who monopolizes or attempts
to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce is guilty of a felony.29
The courts have long recognized that the provisions of the Sherman Act
cannot be interpreted and enforced exactly as they read because doing so
would outlaw the entire body of contract law.30 The Supreme Court has
developed two tests analyzing whether a specific restraint on competition
violates the Sherman Act.
The first of these tests focuses on those agreements whose nature and
necessary effect are so plainly anti-competitive that no elaborate study of the
industry is needed to establish their illegality.31 Certain relationships are per
se violations of the Sherman Act and are strictly prohibited without a need to
analyze the reasonableness of the restraints.32 In Northern Pacific Rail Road Co.
v. United States, Mr. Justice Black stated, "[t]here are certain agreements or
practices which because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of
any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and
therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have
caused or the business excuse for their use."33
The second test analyzes those agreements whose effects on competition can
only be evaluated by analyzing the facts specific to that industry, the history of
the restraint, and the reasons why it was imposed.34 This test is commonly
referred to as the "rule of reason test". The Supreme Court articulated the rule
of reason test in Board of Trade of Chicago v. United States; the inquiry mandated
by the Court is whether the challenged agreement promotes or suppresses
2815 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
2915 U.S.C. § 2 (1988). The statute provides that
[elvery person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize,
or combine or conspire with any other persons, to monopolize
any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or
with foreign nations, shall be punished by fine not exceeding
one million dollars if a corporation, or, if any other person, one
hundred thousand dollars, or by imprisonment no exceeding
three years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of
the court.
Id.
3 0National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978).
Congress did not intend the Sherman Act "to delineate the full meaning of the statute
or its application in concrete situations." Id. The legislative history makes it perfectly
clear that it expected the courts to give shape to the statute's broad meaning by drawing
on common-law tradition. Id.
3lid. at 692.
32 Northern Pac. R.R. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
3 3 d. at 5.
3 4 Board of Trade of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1917).
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competition. 35 The true test of legality is whether the imposed restraint is one
that merely regulates or even promotes competition, or is one that may
suppress or even destroy competition.36 In Board of Trade, the Court first
considered the nature of the rule imposed and what restraints were created.
The Court then considered the scope of the rule and how large a part of the
industry does the restraint apply. Finally, the Court examined the effects of the
rule and determined that the restriction imposed by the employers was not
unreasonable and the employer should not be subjected to antitrust
violations. 37
B. Establishing Baseball's Exemption
The exemption Major League Baseball enjoys from the antitrust laws was
created in Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Professional
Baseball Clubs.38 The plaintiff in that case belonged to a rival league of the
defendants, Federal League of Professional Baseball Clubs, formed in 1913 to
host baseball exhibitions during World War I and to compete against the
defendants. 39 The plaintiff alleged that the defendants destroyed the Federal
League by purchasing all the other teams. The plaintiff attempted to establish
four assertions demonstrating that the defendants violated the antitrust laws.
They attempted to show that the defendants were engaged in interstate
commerce and that the interstate relationship among the clubs was
predominant, that baseball was seeking a profit, that the gate receipts were
divided between the home and visiting team, and that the business of baseball
should be distinguished from the mere playing of games for exercise.40 The
jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for $80,000. The Court of Appeals,
however, found that the defendants were not within the scope of the Sherman
Act because baseball exhibitions were not interstate commerce. 41
In this landmark decision, Justice Holmes, speaking for a unanimous Court,
stated that baseball is in business to give exhibitions of baseball and that these
exhibitions were purely state affairs and not interstate commerce as required
35 Id. at 238.
3 6 1d.
3 71d.
38259 U.S. 200 (1922).
3 9See Lafferty, supra note 28.
4 OFlood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 256,269 (1972); see also Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore,
Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200, 201-06 (1922).
41Federal Baseball, 259 U.S. at 209. Justice Holmes viewed the business of baseball as
merely exhibitions which are purely state affairs. Id. at 208. Furthermore, the fact that
the games were transported across the states was merely incidental and not essential.
"That which in its consummation is not commerce does not become commerce among
the States because the transportation that we have mentioned takes place." Id. at 209.
19951
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by the Sherman Act.42 Therefore, the Supreme Court viewed baseball as not
constituting interstate commerce, and thus, not subject to the provisions of the
Sherman Act. Although the correctness of this opinion has been criticized on
many occasions, it has been generally accepted as the controlling authority for
Major League Baseball's antitrust exemption. 43
The Supreme Court next visited the issue of baseball's antitrust exemption
in 1953 in Toolson v. New York.44 In Toolson, the Court recognized the precedential
effect of Federal Baseball and that, for thirty years, baseball developed the belief
that the existing antitrust laws did not apply to baseball.45 Therefore, the Court
concluded that the issue of removing the judicially created exemption for Major
League Baseball should be left to the legislature rather than the judiciary: "if
there are evils in this field which now warrant application to it of the antitrust
laws it should be by legislation."46
The Supreme Court demonstrated its desire to leave the issue to the
legislature rather than overruling their prior 1922 decision in Federal Baseball
and changing the way the antitrust laws applied to baseball. The legislature
has failed to remove baseball's exemption in the seventy-four years following
the Federal Baseball decision.
The Supreme Court last visited the issue of baseball's antitrust exemption in
Flood v. Kuhn. Curt Flood, a ballplayer who refused to play baseball for
Philadelphia in 1970 following a trade from St. Louis, challenged baseball's
reserve clause and charged that baseball had violated the antitrust laws by
forcing him to play for Philadelphia.47 The Flood Court examined the history
of the exemption including the two prior Supreme Court decisions, and
restated the reasons for the Toolson decision.48 The Court affirmed Toolson based
on three decades of Congressional inaction despite awareness of the decision
in Federal Baseball, the fact that baseball has been left alone to develop with the
exemption, a reluctance to overrule with the consequent retroactive effect, and
421d.
43 See Corbett v. Chandler, 202 F.2d 428 (6th Cir. 1953); Portland Baseball Club, Inc.
v. Baltimore Baseball Club, Inc., 282 F.2d 680 (9th Cir. 1960); Niemiec v. Seattle Rainer
Baseball Club, Inc., 67F. Supp. 705 (W.D.Wash. 1946). Seealso State v. Milwaukee Braves,
Inc., 31 Wis. 2d 699,144 N.W. 2d 1, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 990 (1966).
44 See Toolson v. New York Yankees, 346 U.S. 356 (1953).
451d. at 357.
461d.
4 7 See 407 U.S. at 258 (1972). Curt Flood was a professional baseball player who began
his major league career in 1956 when he signed toplay for the Cincinnati Reds. The Reds
later traded Flood to St. Louis and Flood blossomed as a major league ballplayer. In 1969
Flood was traded to the Philadelphia Phillies. He refused to play for Philadelphia and
petitioned the Commissioner (Bowie Kuhn) to make him a free agent. Bowie Kuhn
denied the request and Flood then instituted this antitrust action. Id. at 264-65.
48 Flood, 407 U.S. at 258.
[VCol. 43:693
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol43/iss4/6
BASEBALL'S ANTITRUST EXEMPTION
a professed desire that any needed remedy emanate from the legislature rather
than the courts.49
Justice Blackmon concluded the Flood opinion by stating eight principles
which now apply after the Flood decision.50 The Court held that professional
baseball is a business that is engaged in interstate commerce, that baseball's
exemption is an exception and an anomaly, and that Federal Baseball and Toolson
have become an aberration confined strictly to baseball.5 1 This aberration,
however, has been present for nearly half a century (at the time of the Flood
opinion) and thus, it is subject to the benefit of stare decisis, and any changes
should come by legislative action rather than judicial order.52
Thus, Flood recognized that baseball is indeed interstate commerce and that,
in Federal Baseball, Justice Holmes was wrong in stating that baseball is not
engaged in interstate commerce. Baseball's exemption must now be premised
on something other than the fact that it is not interstate commerce. The Flood
Court continued to recognize and uphold the result of Federal Baseball.
However, after Flood, the legal justification for the exemption is much weaker.
The only factors keeping the exemption alive are stare decisis and the fact that
Congress has yet to act with any legislation that would remove the
exemption.53
The Supreme Court has discussed the issue of baseball's exemption in ruling
on the application of the antitrust laws to the other professional sports.54 In
Radovich v. NFL, the Supreme Court stated, that if it was considering the issue
of application of the antitrust laws to baseball, it would have no doubt that the
laws would apply, but that Federal Baseball had held the business of baseball
outside the scope of the Act.55 The Second Circuit also indicated its
disapproval of Federal Baseball in ruling on another baseball challenge, by
acknowledging its belief that Federal Baseball was not one of Mr. Justice Holmes'
491d. at 273-74.
50ld. at 282.
51Id. at 282-83.
52Flood, 407 U.S. at 282. The Court also noted that the other professional sports were
not so exempt from the antitrust laws. Id. at 283. Furthermore, the Court expressed its
concern about the confusion and retroactivity problems thatwould result from a judicial
rather than a legislative overturning of Federal Baseball. Id.
531d. at 282-83.
54 Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957).
55/d. at 452. Radovich was an action brought to obtain treble damages and injunctive
relief from the National Football League (NFL) under § 4 of the Clayton Act. Id. at 446.
The petitioners alleged that the NFL owners entered into a conspiracy to monopolize
and control organized professional football in the United States. Id. at 447. Radovich
was a former player of a rival league (All-American Conference) who was boycotted by
the owners from playing in another league. Id. The Court concluded that Federal Baseball
and Toolson did not control the disposition of this case. Id. at 448.
1995]
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happiest days,5 6 that the rationale of Toolson is extremely dubious, and that the
distinction between baseball and other professional sports is unrealistic,
inconsistent and illogical.57
C. Application of Antitrust Laws to Baseball
Had Major League Baseball not been granted the exemption from antitrust
laws in 1922, the courts would be forced to analyze the industry by using either
the per se test articulated in National Society of Professional Engineers, or the rule
of reason test established in Board of Trade of Chicago. Therefore, the courts must
make a determination of which rule is applicable to the industry of baseball.
Due to the history of the courts in analyzing the other professional sports for
antitrust violations, the courts would likely reject the per se violations and
proceed to analyze baseball under a rule of reason test.58
In Mackey v. National Football League, the court viewed professional football
as having some of the characteristics of a joint venture because the teams have
a stake in the success of other teams.59 Therefore, the analysis proceeded under
a rule of reason test:60 "although businessmen cannot wholly evade the
antitrust laws by characterizing their operation as a joint venture, we conclude
that the unique nature of the business of professional football renders it
inappropriate to mechanically apply per se illegality rules".61
Under the reasoning and analysis provided in Mackey, Major League
Baseball would likely be analyzed under the rule of reason test. Major League
Baseball can also be considered a joint venture, similar to professional foot-
56 Salerno v. American League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 429 F.2d 1003,1005 (2dCir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1001 (1971), (citing Radovich v. National Football League,
352 U.S. 445, 452 (1957)).
571d. Salerno involved a challenge to baseball by a group of former umpires in the
American League of Professional Baseball Clubs. Id. at 1004. The Supreme Court should
retain the exclusive privilege of overruling its own decisions, and they are not certain
that the Supreme Court is willing to overrule Federal Baseball and Toolson. Id. at 1005.
58 See Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed,434 U.S. 801 (1977). For a rule of reason application to professional sports see, e.g., UnitedStates v. International Boxing Club of New York, Inc., 348 U.S. 236 (1955); McCourt v.
California Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d 1193 (6th Cir. 1979).
59 Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed,
434 U.S. 801 (1977).
6OMackey, 543 F.2d at 620. The court reiterated the test established by Chicago Board
of Tradev. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918), of whether the restraint imposed is justified
by legitimate business purposes, and is not more restrictive than necessary. Id. Footballis a joint venture and no one club is interested in driving another team out of business,
since if the League fails, no one team can survive. Id. at 619; see also United States v.
National Football League, 116 F. Supp. 319, 323 (E.D. Pa. 1953).
61Mackey, 543 F.2d at 619.
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ball.62 Although the twenty eight teams in the league compete against one
another every year on the field and in the market for players, they depend on
one another for the continuing stability of the league. The teams want to beat
one another and become the best in the league. The goal of the teams is not,
however, to drive each other out of business because the whole league would
suffer. No team wants to seriously damage the financial status and stability of
any other team. They all depend on one another for the continued existence of
the league.63
Next, the factors the courts have used in applying the rule of reason test to
alleged antitrust violations must be examined along with a discussion of their
possible application to Major League Baseball. A court would be forced to
examine the nature of the restraint, the scope of the restraint, and to how large
of a part of the industry the restraint applies. Other factors the courts have
articulated in evaluating the reasonableness of a restraint include the existence
of less restrictive alternatives to realize legitimate, pro-competitive objectives,"
the history purpose and effect of the restraint,65 and the balance of the
pro-competitive and the anti-competitive effects of the restraint. 66
The major restraint on labor used by Major League Baseball owners through
the years and challenged in the three Supreme Court cases67 is the reserve
clause. Although the effects of this clause have been minimized through
collective bargaining, an analysis of its effects and application to the antitrust
laws is beneficial. The owners created and implemented this clause in 1879 to
combat the large economic losses they faced if they allowed the talented players
to leave their teams and pursue more money from other teams.68 This clause
allowed the owners to retain a player's service in perpetuity and prevent the
player from playing for any other team.
Since the rise to power of the Major League Baseball Players' Association
(MLBPA) in the late 1960's, the players have had limited success in challenging
62 See Jeffrey E. Levine, The Legality of the National Basketball Association Salary Cap, 11
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT L. J. 71, 79 (1992).
63 d. at 80 n.57. According to Judge Robert Bork, "the members of a league cannot
compete in the way that members of other industries can. It is neither in the interests of
the members of the league nor of the public generally that the more efficient teams
should drive out the less efficient. If one team goes out of business, all are endangered.
This suggests that the concept of business competition may be irrelevant as applied to
the relationships between members of a league." Id. (citing United States v. National
Football League, 116 F. Supp. 319, 323 (E.D. Pa. 1953)).
64Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173 (D. D.C. 1978).
65 National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978).
66 Board of Trade of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
67 Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972); Todson v. New York Yankees, 346 U.S. 356
(1953); Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Professional
Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
68See Lafferty, supra note 27, at 1279.
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and limiting the reserve clause.69 The MLBPA, through the collective
bargaining agreements reached with the owners, has been successful in
attainting free agency for the players after six years of service, and allowing
those free agents to market their services to other teams more willing and able
to meet their salary demands.70 The owners, however, have now proposed a
system (either the salary cap or the luxury tax) that threatens to seriously
curtail, and possibly eliminate, all the gains the union has enjoyed through the
years of collective bargaining.
Placing Major League Baseball's original reserve clause which bound a
player to a team for life under antitrust scrutiny would likely result in the courts
finding violations similar to the ones found in the other professional sports.71
Applying the factors stated previously to the reserve clause, the courts would
likely find that the reserve clause suppresses competition in the labor market
by forcing players to stay with their original teams, and therefore, violates the
Sherman Act as an unreasonable restraint on competition. The original clause
was exceedingly broad and applied to the whole industry. This may have been
appropriate in the early years of baseball to nurture the game in its infancy and
to prevent escalating salaries when the revenues generated by the game could
not keep pace.
Due to the enormous growth in both popularity and revenue that the
industry has enjoyed in the seventy-four years since Federal Baseball, however,
Major League Baseball no longer needs this judicially created protection. The
owners no longer need to rely on the reserve clause or the antitrust exemption
to limit the movement of players and can now limit player movement through
legitimate means arrived at through collective bargaining agreements
negotiated with the players' union.
In Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., the court stated that a factor to be considered in
applying the rule of reason test is the existence of less restrictive alternatives to
realize legitimate objectives.72 Preserving the game and controlling salaries are
clearly legitimate objectives for the owners to protect the profitability of
baseball. However, alternatives to the reserve clause do exist and have been
created through the collective bargaining agreements between the owners and
players. The effect of the original reserve clause was to bind the professional
ballplayer to one team and to allow that team to enjoy his services as long as
he plays the game. Through collective bargaining the players have been
69 Id. at 1281.
70 See HEYLAR, supra note 14.
71See Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957) (football); United
States v. International Boxing Club of New York, Inc., 348 U.S. 236 (1955) (boxing);
Gunter Harz Sports, Inc. v. United States Tennis Ass'n, 665 F.2d 222 (8th Cir. 1981).
(tennis); Blalock v. Ladies Professional Golf Ass'n, 359 F. Supp. 1260 (N.D. Ga. 1973)
(golf); Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F.
Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (hockey); Washington Professional Basketball Corp. v.
National Basketball Association, 147 F. Supp. 154 (S.D. N.Y. 1956) (basketball).
72Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173,1187-89 (D.C. 1978).
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successful in achieving free agency after six years of service in baseball. No
other industry in our capitalistic society has been able to keep their workers in
perpetuity, preventing them from working for any other company in that field.
Individuals in this country have the benefit of marketing their special
services to any potential employer. The result of the reserve clause is exactly
the result that Board of Trade of Chicago attempted to prevent in its true test of
legality.73 This clause had the effect of destroying the ability of the players to
market their services to other teams. The players should not lose this basic
freedom enjoyed by the rest of the country simply because they have chosen
to play professional baseball.
A second restraint that requires examination under the antitrust laws is the
salary cap, or in the alternative, the luxury tax which has similar effects on the
labor market. This analysis begins by discussing the salary caps currently in
place in other professional sports. Both the National Basketball Association
(NBA) and the National Football League (NFL) have a salary cap in place that
limits the amount any team can spend on their players. The NBA salary cap
agreement has been in place since the Collective Bargaining Agreement of
1983.74 The salary cap is a mechanism through which the owners can limit the
amount that any one team can spend to field its team, while also limiting the
earning potential of the players. These restraints are implemented by
establishing a ceiling on team payrolls while guaranteeing the players
fifty-three percent of the league's defined gross revenues. 75
Leon Wood, a player who refused to accept an offer from the team that held
his draft rights, challenged the NBA's salary cap in 1984.76 Wood alleged that
the salary cap would force him to sign for an amount far below his value on
the open market absent a salary cap.77 The Court of Appeals stated that the
salary cap was not the product solely of an agreement among competitors in a
league but was "embodied in a collective agreement between employers and a
labor organization reached through procedures mandated by federal labor
73 Board of Trade of Chicago, 246 U.S. at 238-39.
74 See Levine supra note 62.
751d. at 74. This article provides an intensive review of the NBA's salary cap and its
possible violations of federal antitrust law. The NBA's salary cap does not violate
antitrust laws, and the cap has been an integral part of the success the NBA experienced
during the 1980s. Id. at 98. The salary cap has been the most important factor in helping
stabilize the NBA financially. Because the salary cap has had the effect of keeping the
NBA's best players somewhat evenly distributed throughout the league, NBA games
are now more competitive and exciting." Id. See also, Scott J. Foraker, The National
Basketball Association Salary Cap: An Antitrust Violation?, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 157 (1985).
This article comes to the opposite conclusion and states that the salary cap should be
subject to the antitrust laws. Id. at 180.
76 Wood v. National Basketball Ass'n, 602 F. Supp. 525 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), affd, 809 F.2d
954 (2d Cir. 1987).
771d. at 527.
1995]
13Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1995
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
legislation."78 Therefore, because they reached the collective bargaining
agreement through a process of collective bargaining, the court did not find
that the salary cap agreement violated antitrust law.79 The salary cap clearly
imposes a restraint on player movement and earning potential for the players.
The players' union however, agreed to the salary cap. The proposed luxury tax
would also contain the same restraints on player movement that are contained
in the salary cap because it would seriously dissuade teams from pursuing any
high-priced free agent.
Any restraint on player movement that may be implemented by the owners
absent a collective bargaining agreement with the players could not enjoy the
protection the NBA salary cap enjoyed in the Wood decision. As the court
pointed out, the NBA salary cap was the product of a collective bargaining
agreement reached by the owners and the players' union.80 This is not the case
in Major League Baseball. The baseball owners attempted to negotiate with the
players to reach a collective bargaining agreement that would allow the
owners to control their labor costs. These negotiations failed and the parties
were not able to reach an agreement. Therefore, if the antitrust exemption is
removed, the owners will be forced to find an alternative way of sustaining
their proposals by bargaining with the players' union. The analysis of the
implementation of any new restraint in an environment where the antitrust
exemption for Major League Baseball has been removed will be discussed at
length later in this note.
The next step in the analysis is to determine where the antitrust exemption
now stands. Because the Supreme Court originally granted the exemption
because it did not view baseball as interstate commerce, the exemption must
now stand upon another justifiable ground.81 That ground has become the
precedent set by Federal Baseball. As stated previously, the Court has recognized
that if baseball had a clean slate, the exemption would not be granted and the
restraints imposed by the baseball owners would be subject to antitrust
scrutiny.82
In a dissenting opinion in Flood, Justice Marshall addressed the issue of stare
decisis by stating that Flood is a difficult case because the court is tom between
the principle of stare decisis and the knowledge that the decisions in Federal
Baseball and Toolson, which establish the exemption, contradict more recent and
reasoned cases.83 Now that baseball is considered interstate commerce, a
re-examination of the antitrust exemption would require that Major League
78 Wood v. National Basketball Ass'n, 809 F.2d 954, 959 (2d Cir. 1987).
791d.
80Id.
81 Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258,282 (1972) (finding that baseball is fully entitled to the
benefit of stare decisis).
82 Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957).
83 Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 290 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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Baseball be brought within the coverage of the antitrust laws.84 Justice Marshall
urged for an overturning of the exemption. While Justice Marshall recognized
that past decisions cannot be lightly overruled, he asserted that when errors
deny substantial federal rights, like the right to compete freely as guaranteed
by the antitrust laws, the Court must admit its error and correct it.85
The Flood Court admitted that Justice Holmes was wrong in stating that
baseball was not interstate commerce.86 The Court, however, refused to
overturn the exemption and sustain the exemption for Major League Baseball.
The Court should not continue to hold onto the exemption merely because of
a precedent which the Court freely admits was mistaken in its fundamental
belief as to why baseball was exempt from the Sherman Act. The Supreme
Court has on previous occasions admitted its error and reversed a previous
decision.87
After analyzing Flood and the other opinions dealing with the antitrust
exemption for professional sports, it becomes strikingly clear that the Supreme
Court and the Courts of Appeals have become skeptical of the decision in
Federal Baseball and, as pointed out in Radovich, the exemption would never
have been created by a modem court.88 However, it is also clear that the
Supreme Court has absolutely no intention of removing the exemption. It has
failed to do so in the seventy-four years since Federal Baseball, although it had
the perfect opportunity to do so in Flood, when it destroyed the premise of the
exemption created in Federal Baseball. Thus, the remedy will likely have to
emanate from Congress. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has expressed that
the congressional processes are more accommodating, affording the whole
industry hearings and an opportunity to assist in the formulation of new
legislation. The resulting product is therefore more likely to protect the industry
and the public alike, and not have the retroactive effect of a judicial decision.89
84Id. at 291.
851d. at 293. Justice Marshall, referring to Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v.
University of Illinois Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971) and Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks
Union, 398 U.S. 235,241 (1970), points to two instances where the Court reversed a prior
decision.
86407 U.S. at 282.
87See Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Found., 402 U.S. 313
(1971); Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 US. 235,241 (1970).
88 Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445,452 (1957).
89 d. The orderly way to remedy the antitrust exemption problem with Major League
Baseball is by legislation rather than judicial decree. Id. The scope of congressional action
would be known by the parties in advance and effective dates for the legislation could
be set, thereby removing any surprise Id. Therefore, congressional action would afford
both interested parties, owners and players, notice to prepare for the new effects that
an end to the antitrust exemption would precipitate.
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D. Proposed Legislation to Remove the Exemption
The 104th Congress has before it several proposed bills that would eliminate
or restrict the antitrust exemption for Major League Baseball, including a bill
sponsored by Utah Senator Orrin Hatch.90 An additional bill has been
proposed by New York Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan and referred to
committee.91 This proposed bill, known as The National Pastime Preservation
Act, would repeal the antitrust exemption from Major League Baseball by
amending the antitrust laws to reverse the results of Federal Baseball, Toolson,
and Flood.92
Senator Moynihan points out that this proposed bill would not cure all of
baseball's troubles, but that it is an essential step that is long overdue.93 The
proposed bill has also received support from Senator Graham, who also
believes that it is time to subject baseball to the same laws of competition that
apply to other industries in this country.94 Senator Moynihan has asserted that
the exemption allows Major League owners to "act as a cartel."95 The
implementation of the salary cap is directly attributable to a misuse of the
antitrust exemption.96
The House of Representatives has also sent several proposals to remove
Major League Baseball's antitrust exemption to the Committee on the Judi-
90S. 627, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). The bill is entitled "Major League Baseball
Antitrust Reform Act of 1995." The bill would amend the Clayton Act to make the
antitrust laws applicable to the business of Major League Baseball. Id. The bill provides
that nothing in it will affect the applicability of antitrust laws: (1) to professional
baseball's amateur draft, the minor league reserve clause, the Professional Baseball
Agreement, or any other matter relating to the minor leagues; (2) to any restraint by
professional baseball on franchise relocation; or (3) to the Sports Broadcasting Act of
1961. Id. The bill was referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee on March 27,1995, and
reported favorably out of committee on August 3, 1995. 141 CONG. REc. S 982 (1995).
91141 CONG. REC. S 15,176 (daily ed. Jan. 4,1995). The proposal by Senator Moynihan
is called the National Pastime Preservation Act. Senator Moynihan recognizes that the
Flood decision laid responsibility for Major League Baseball's antitrust exemption on
Congress.Id. The Senator also believes that the proposed bill maynotsolveall of baseball
problems, however, it is long over due since the business of baseball has become big
business. Id. Furthermore, the proposed bill contains a specific provision that the
antitrust laws will not apply to conduct that occurred before the enactment of this bill.
Id.
92141 CoNG. REc. S 15, 176 (dailey ed. Jan. 4,1995).
931d.
94141 CONG. REC. § 518 (daily ed. Jan. 5, 1995). Senator Graham announced his
support of the National Pastime Preservation Act. See supra note 81. He urges the other
members of the Senate to restore "our national pastime" by considering removal of the
antitrust exemption. 141 CONG. REC. § 518 (1995).
95141 CONG. REc. § 15, 176 (daily ed. Jan. 4, 1995).
96141 CoNG. REc. § 518 (daily ed. Jan. 5, 1995).
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ciary.97 One of the proposals, H. R. 106, is co-sponsored by former Major League
Baseball player and now Congressman Jim Bunning. Congressman Bunning
has stated, "[there's no need for the exemption. If they (Major League Baseball
owners) were coming to Congress now and asking for one, they wouldn't be
granted this exemption. The Supreme Court has said Congress should look at
it.' 98 Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich, however, does not see the urgency
in Congress acting on the issue and sees it as a dispute between "millionaire
owners and millionaire players who play in stadiums provided by
taxpayers."99
E. Recent Judicial Interpretation of the Exemption
In Piazza v. Major League Baseball, the court limited Major League Baseball's
antitrust exemption to the reserve clause previously described.100 A group of
investors who attempted to purchase the San Francisco Giants and move the
franchise to Tampa Bay brought the antitrust action because their offer was
rejected by the owners.10 1 The ownership committee, who reviews potential
baseball franchise owners, attempted to elicit offers to keep the team in San
Francisco and eventually accepted a bid that was $15 million less than the offer
by the Tampa Bay group.1°2
The Piazza court stated that the Flood decision made it clear that the antitrust
exemption granted in Federal Baseball only applied to baseball's reserve clause,
and that application of stare decisis simply permits no alternative way to
interpret Flood other than confining the precedential value of Federal Baseball
97141 CONG. REC. § 163 (daily ed. Jan. 4, 1995). H.R. 45 is a bill by Mr. Conyers to
apply the antitrust laws of the United States to Major League Baseball. H.R. 45 104th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). H.R. 105 is a bill by Mr. Biliarakis to amend the Act of September
30,1961, "to exclude Major League Baseball from the antitrust exemption applicable to
certain television contracts." H.R. 105,104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). H.R. 106 is a bill by
Mr. Bilirakis to provide that Major League Baseball teams be subject to the antitrust
laws. H.R. 106,104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). H.R. 120 is another bill also by Mr. Bilirakis
to apply the antitrust laws to baseball. H.R. 120 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
98Murray Chass, Halls of Congress Fill With New Lobbyists, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 9,1995, at
§ 8, at 10. Congressman Bunning stated that his own feeling on the situation is that
Gongressjs waiting for the players and the owners to reach a collective bargaining
agreement withofat interference from Congress. Id. He feels that, "Congress will act on
three conditions: [ojne, there is no commissioner in the job; two, there is no labor
agreement in hand and three, the major leagues open camps to anyone who desires to
enter." Id. These three conditions seem very likely given the current climate in baseball.
See supra notes 13-18 for previous discussion on current labor dispute. The owners have
shown no desire to hire a permanent commissioner to replace acting commissioner Bud
Selig (Milwaukee Brewers' owner).
9 91d. Murray Chess, Halls of Congress Fill With New Lobbyists, Jan. 9,1995, § 8, at 10.
100831 F. Supp. 420 (E.D. Pa. 1993). For an intensive review of this decision and its
effects on Major League Baseball's antitrust exemption see Lafferty, supra note 28.
104d. at 422.
1021d. at 423.
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and Toolson to the precise facts involved.103 The court concluded that, in Flood,
the Supreme Court exercised its discretion to invalidate the rule of Federal
Baseball and Toolson; therefore, lower courts are not bound to those prior
decisions as a matter of stare decisis. 104 To buttress their point, the court cites
to Group Life & Health Insurance Co. v. Royal Drug Co., a Supreme Court decision
stating that it is well settled law to narrowly construe exemptions from the
antitrust laws.105 Therefore, this decision specifically limits the antitrust
exemption to the reserve clause.106
The advent of federal labor laws and collective bargaining between
employers and employees has diminished the application of the antitrust laws
to agreements between the employers and employees. The second part of this
note will examine the conflicting goals of antitrust and labor law, and will
analyze how the courts may handle the restraints imposed by the baseball
owners.
M. CLASH BETWEEN ANTITRUST AND LABOR LAw
Simply removing the antitrust exemption from Major League Baseball will
not solve the labor dispute between the owners and players. The players' union
and the owners must reach a collective bargaining agreement before the current
dispute will end. Simply removing the antitrust exemption may facilitate an
agreement but will not guarantee it. To satisfy federal labor policy, a collective
bargaining agreement between the parties must be reached. Certain aspects of
labor law, as well as its intersection with antitrust law, must be understood in
order to grasp what the removal of the antitrust exemption from Major League
Baseball would mean.
Therefore, an analysis of the labor dispute with the proposed removal of the
antitrust exemption must follow. This note will analyze and forecast the issues
that may arise if baseball is subjected to the antitrust laws. This analysis will
begin first by discussing the conflicting goals of antitrust and labor law and
how unions by their very nature restrain trade. Additionally, the imposition of
any restraint, that is not a part of a collective bargaining agreement, by the
owners will be discussed, and the restraints potential for remaining a part of a
subsequent collective bargaining agreement.
1031d. at 437.
104Piazza, 831 F. Supp. at 438.
1051d. See Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 231 (1979), for
a case that narrowly construes the application of an exemption from the antitrust laws.
106 See Lafferty, supra note 27. The Latour article suggests that the antitrust exemption
is now limited to apply only to the reserve clause in Major League Baseball. Id. at 1292.
Piazza successfully restricted the Major League Baseball antitrust exemption to apply
only to the reserve clause, and adhered to the binding Supreme Court precedent
established in Federal Baseball, Toolson, and Flood. Id.
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A. History of Labor Law
The federal labor laws107 demonstrate a Congressional policy favoring
collective bargaining between management and their employees as the best
means of settling labor disputes.108 Labor laws encourage employees to form
unions to act as their bargaining representatives and place a duty on both the
union and management to bargain in good faith to reach an agreeable
settlement. 109 Furthermore, federal labor law discourages judicial intervention
in labor relations and encourages the parties involved to solve their own
differences at the bargaining table without intervention from the courts or the
federal government.1 10
"Unions by their very nature are combinations of individuals that seek to
restrain an employer's ability to deal with its employees on an individual
basis."111 Therefore, because of their restraint on employers, unions should also
be subject to the antitrust laws created in the Sherman Act. The original Act
contained no language that specifically exempted unions from coverage.
Employee groups strenuously argued that unions should enjoy an exemption
from the antitrust laws and that applying antitrust laws to their behavior would
seriously jeopardize their future.112
107See Clayton Act § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1988); Clayton Act § 20, 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1988);
Norris LaGuardia Act §§ 1-15, Id. §101-115; National Labor Relations Act §§ 1-19, Id.
§§ 151-169; Labor Management Relations Act §§ 1-503, Id. §§ 141-197, cited in Note,
Releasing Superstars From Peonage: Union Consent and the Nonstatutory Labor Exemption,
104 HARV. L. REV. 874,876 (1991).
108Note, Releasing Superstars From Peonage: Union Consent and the Nonstatutory Labor
Exemption, 104 HARV. L. REV. 874,876 (1991) [hereinafter Releasing Superstares]. The Note
argues that union consent must be given before the parties have the opportunity to avail
themselvesto thebenefitof thenonstatutory exemption from labor thatwillbe discussed
at length later. Id. at 875. It further proposes a standard by which to decide when union
consent to a particular labor restraint being enforced by an employer is no longer valid
to protect the restraint. Id. The exemption should expire with the collective bargaining
agreement to give the courts bright-line guidance in enforcing. Id. at 891.
1091d. at 875.
1101d. at 876.
111Kieran M. Corcoran, When Does the Buzzer Sound?: The Nonstatutory Labor Exemption
In Professional Sports, 94 COLuM. L. REV. 1045,1048 (1994). "Strikes and boycotts, the most
obvious forms of union collective action, restrict the ability of individual employees to
negotiate a deal with the employer. Such collective action not only restricts the
movement of labor, but directly results in restraints on the movement of the employer's
goods." Id. at 1048. See also John C. Weistart & Cym H. Lowell, The Law of Sports 528
(1979).
112See Corcoran, supra note 111. This article examines whether the nonstatutory labor
exemption should continue to apply to a player restraint after the expiration of a
collective bargaining agreement, and if so, for how long. Id. at 1045.
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In response to this union protest, Congress enacted two measures exempting
union activities from the antitrust laws.113 The Clayton Act, enacted in 1914,
declared that "[the] human being is not a commodity or article of commerce,"
and that antitrust laws, therefore, should not be construed to prohibit the
formation and operation of labor unions.114 However, the Supreme Court
construed the Clayton Act narrowly, making further legislation necessary to
protect union activity and to nurture their growth.115
Congress then enacted the Norris-LaGuardia Act in 1932 to provide unions
with expanded protection and to declare a federal policy in favor of the
organization of labor.116 Together, the Clayton Act and the Norris-LaGuardia
Act create the statutory labor exemption and shield a broad range of union
activities from antitrust scrutiny."117 The courts have subsequently been
granted more guidance than these early statutes by the passage of the National
Labor Relations Act of 1935 (Wagner Act) and the Labor Management Act of
1947 (Taft-Hartley Act).118
Congress passed these Acts to promote the collective bargaining process and
found that
the protection by law of the right of employees to organize and bargain
collectively safeguards commerce from injury, impairment, or
interruption, and promotes the flow of commerce by removing certain
recognized sources of industrial strife and unrest, by encouraging
practices fundamental to the friendly adjustment of industrial disputes
arising out of differences as to wages, hours, or other working
conditions, and by restorin equality of bargaining power between
employers and employees.
1 r
The NLRA stated that it will be the policy of the United States to encourage the
practice and procedure of the collective bargaining process and to protect the
formation of worker associations (unions).120
113 See Clayton Act, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 12-27, 44, 29 U.S.C. § 52-53 (1988);
Norris-LaGuardia Act, codified at 29 U.S.C. § 101-115 (1988). To combat the union
complaints about the application of the Sherman Act in the labor context and the use of
injunctions to stop labor strikes, Congress passed these two pieces of legislation to create
the nonstatutory labor exemption. See Corcoran, supra note 111, at 1049.
11415 U.S.C. § 17 (1988).
115See Corcoran, supra note 111, at 1049. See also Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering,
254 U.S. 443 (1921).
11629 U.S.C. § 102 (1988). "It is necessary that [the individual unorganized worker]
have full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives
.. to negotiate the terms and conditions of his employment ..." Id.
117See Corcoran, supra note 111, at 1049-50.
11829 U.S.C. § 151-169 (1988); 29 U.S.C. § 141-144 (1988).
11929 U.S.C. § 151 (1988).
1201d.
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B. Statutory and Nonstatutory Exemptions for Labor Unions
To deal with the convergence of labor and antitrust laws and to further the
goals of labor law, the courts have recognized a statutory and a nonstatutory
exemption for labor unions and collective bargaining agreements. 121 The
statutory exemption protects certain agreements that are essential to the
structure and economic welfare of the collective bargaining process. 122
Congress created this statutory exemption to insulate legitimate collective
activity by employees, which is inherently anti-competitive but is favored by
federal labor policy, from application of the antitrust laws.123
The second exemption, commonly referred to as the "nonstatutory
exemption", immunizes certain results of the collective bargaining process and
protects the agreements from antitrust scrutiny.124 In order to properly
accommodate the congressional policy of favoring free competition in business
markets with the congressional policy of favoring collective bargaining, certain
employer-union agreements must be granted a limited nonstatutory
exemption from antitrust sanctions.125 As the Supreme Court stated in Connell
Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local Union No. 100, "the nonstatutory exemption has its
source in the strong labor policy favoring the association of employees to
eliminate competition over wages and working conditions."126 The remainder
of this note will focus on this nonstatutory exemption as it applies to the current
labor dispute between the Major League owners and the players' union. The
nonstatutory exemption may be asserted to immunize, any restraints imposed
121Releasing Superstars, supra note 108, at 876 nl0.
122Id.
123 See Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 611 (8th Cir. 1976); Apex
Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940). This statutory exemption extends to
legitimate union activities unilaterally undertaken in furtherance of its own interests.
The exemption does not extend to concerted action or agreements between unions and
employers. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 611.
124 Releasing Superstars, supra note 108, at 877. '"he nonstatutory exemption is
essentially the corollary of the statutory exemption: it would be illogical to immunize
the labor war while scrutinizing every labor restraint that it produces." Id.
12 5See Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S. 616 (1975)
(union's agreement with employer is not entitled to the nonstatutory exemption from
federal antitrust laws that was recognized in Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea); Local Union
No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965) (exemption
of union-employer agreements from the coverage of the Sherman Act is a matter of
accommodating that Act to the policy of the labor laws).
126 Connell, 421 U.S. at 622. The goals of federal labor policy could never be realized if
their effects on business competition were held to be a violation of the antitrust laws. Id.
Labor policy requires tolerance for the lessening of business competition based on
differences in wages and working conditions that would never be acceptable outside
the labor relationship. Id. The Court held that a direct market restraint on labor will only
be exempted from the federal antitrust laws when the restraint is necessary to protect
fundamental employee interests. Id. at 623.
19951
21Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1995
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
by the owners under a collective bargaining agreement or, after the expiration
of one, from antitrust scrutiny.
The Supreme Court first articulated the nonstatutory labor exemption in
Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea C0.127 The Court noted that the restraints
on management imposed by the employees, that were attained through the
collective bargaining agreement process, were still subject to antitrust attack
and that this fact undermined the effectiveness of the congressional policy of
favoring collective bargaining.128 By weighing the respective interests
involved that the national labor policy expressed in the NLRA, certain
union-employer agreements on when and how long employees must work
must be placed beyond the reach of the Sherman AcL129 An agreement
concerning mandatory elements of a collective bargaining agreement between
the union and the employers is not illegal under the Sherman Act.130
The Court has limited this nonstatutory exemption to parties within the
bargaining relationship and to matters of fundamental employee interest.131
Furthermore, courts have also held that the benefits of the exemption extend
to both parties of the collective bargaining agreement.132 Therefore, either the
Major League owners or the players' union may assert the protection of this
nonstatutory exemption.
The nonstatutory exemption, of collective bargaining agreements from
antitrust scrutiny, created by the courts is an attempt to balance the concerns
of the federal antitrust and labor laws.133 The availability of the exemption
turns on a determination of whether the federal labor interest in collective
bargaining supersedes the federal antitrust interest in free competition under
127381 U.S. 676 (1965).
128 d. at 689; see Corcoran, supra note 111, at 1051. A restraint that involved a matter
of mandatory bargaining under the NLRA, although it has adverse effects on
competition, was exempt from the Sherman Act. Id.
129Meat Cutters, 381 U.S. at 691. An agreement on the subjects of mandatory
bargaining between the union and the employers in a bargaining unit is not illegal under
the Sherman Act, nor is the union's unilateral demand for the same contract of other
employees in the industry. Id.
130Id.
131See Corcoran, supra note 111, at 1052.
132Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 611 (8th Cir. 1976). Non-labor
groups may also avail themselves to the protection from the antitrust laws granted
under the labor exemption. See Meat Cutters, 381 U.S. at 729-30 (opinion of Justice
Goldberg).
133Bridgeman v. National Basketball Ass'n, 675 F. Supp. 960, 965 (D. N.J. 1987).
Bridgeman involved a suit by a group of basketball players who filed a class action suit
against the league and the owners alleging antitrust violations. Id. at 961. The contested
player restraints were the college player draft, the salary cap, and the right of first
refusal, which allowed a team to retain a veteran free agent's services indefinitely by
matching offers received by that player from other NBA teams. Id. at 961-62.
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the circumstances of a particular case.134 That is, does the federal policy of
favoring collective bargaining take preeminence over the antitrust laws? The
exemption is designed to encourage substantive, good faith bargaining on
crucial issues of labor concern and guard against unilateral imposition of terms
as to which there is no agreement. 135
C. Application of the Nonstatutory Exemption to Professional Sports
The first judicial review of the nonstatutory exemption for professional
sports came in Mackey v. NFL, when NFL owners attempted to assert the
exemption to protect their modified reserve clause, known as the "Rozelle
Rule", named for former NFL commissioner Pete Rozelle.136 A group of current
and former professional football players initiated the action, alleging that
enforcement of the NFL's Rozelle Rule constituted an illegal combination and
conspiracy in restraint of trade and denied professional football players the
right to contract freely for their services.137 The district court found that the
"enforcement of the Rozelle Rule constituted a concerted refusal to deal and a
group boycott, and was therefore a per se violation of the Sherman Act."138
The Rozelle Rule resembled the reserve clause in baseball. Under the Rule,
a player who signs with a team is bound to play for that team and no other
team for the length of the contract, plus one additional year at the option of the
team. 139 At the end of the contract and the additional option year, the player
may elect to become a free agent and attempt to sign with another team in the
league.140 However, the owners severely limited this free agency. The
commissioner of the league could award the player's former team one or more
players from the acquiring team as compensation for the lost player.141 This
system, while granting players free agency which the professional baseball
players did not enjoy until 1976, severely dissuaded teams from signing free
agents for fear of losing players as compensation, and therefore, was an alleged
restraint of trade in violation of the Sherman Act.
13 4 1d. at 965. See Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S. 616
(1975); Local Union No. 189, 381 U.S. 676 (1965); Mackey, 543 F.2d 606.
135Bridgenan, 675 F. Supp. at 965.
136Mackey, 543 F.2d. 606.
1371d. at 609.
1381d.
139Mackey, 543 F.2d at 610; Once a player signs a standard contract with any NFL team
he is bound to that team for a minimum of two years. He may become a free agent by
playing out his option year. A player playing out his option is subject to a ten percent
salary cut during that option year. Id.
140Id.
141Id. at 610. Prior to 1963, a team which signed a free agent from another team was
not obligated to pay any compensation to the player's former team. Id. See Corcoran,
supra note 111, at 1058.
1995]
23Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1995
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit began its analysis
of the Rozelle Rule by determining whether the nonstatutory exemption
immunizes the NFL's enforcement of the Rozelle Rule from antitrust liability
as asserted by the owners and, if not, whether the Rule and the manner in which
it has been enforced violate the antitrust laws.1 42 Therefore, the court must first
determine whether the NFL owners can assert protection of the Rozelle Rule
through the nonstatutory exemption. As stated previously, the availability of
the nonstatutory exemption for a particular agreement turns upon "whether
the relevant federal labor policy is deserving of pre-eminence over federal
antitrust policy under the circumstances of the particular case."143
Mackey then articulated and established a three part test to determine
whether the federal labor policy favoring collective bargaining may be given
preeminence over the antitrust laws.144 First, labor policy will only be favored
over antitrust laws when the restraint on trade primarily affects only the parties
to the collective bargaining relationship. 145 Second, the exemption will only
apply when the agreement sought to be exempted concerns mandatory
subjects of collective bargaining.146 "Finally, the policy favoring collective
bargaining is furthered to the degree necessary to override the antitrust laws
only where the agreement sought to be exempted is the product of a bona fide
arm's length bargaining."147
The court then applied the above-mentioned test to the facts presented and
determined that the Rozelle Rule clearly only affects parties to the agreements
sought to be exempted and thereby, satisfied the first principle.148 The Rozelle
Rule also satisfied the second principle because it concerned mandatory
subjects of collective bargaining.149 However, the Rozelle Rule did not satisfy
the third principle because there was no bona fide arm's length bargaining
before the implementation of the Rule, due to the fact that the owners
unilaterally promulgated the Rule in 1963.150 Therefore, the agreements
142Mackey, 543 F.2d at 609.
143 Id. at 613. See Connell Constr. Co v. Plumbers Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S. 616
(1975); Local Union No. 189 Amalgamated Meat Cutters v.Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. 676(1965);
Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
144 Mackey, 543 F.2d at 614.
14 51d.
146 Id.
14 71d.
148 Mackey, 543 F.2d at 615. Clearly, the Rozelle Rule will only affect the owners and
the players.
149 Id. at 615; On its face, the Rozelle Rule did not deal with wages, hours and other
terms or conditions of employment that are required under the NLRA. However, the
court found that the Rule restricts a player's ability to move from one team to another
and has a tendency to suppress player salaries. Id.
150Id. at 616. The court denied a claim by the owners that the players derived a benefit
from the Rozelle Rule. The owners claimed the Rule was a quid pro quo for increased
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between the clubs and the players embodying the Rozelle Rule do not qualify
for the labor exemption by way of the nonstatutory labor exemption.
151
Applying the Mackey rule to the current labor dispute and the
implementation of any restraint by the owners leads to a determination that
Major League Baseball should not be granted the benefit of the nonstatutory
labor exemption. As in Mackey, a new restraint implemented by the owners will
only affect the parties to the collective bargaining agreement. Therefore, the
first principle articulated in Mackey will be satisfied in analyzing the possible
exemption for baseball.152 The second principle, that the exemption will only
exist when the agreement sought to be exempted concerns mandatory subjects
of collective bargaining, is also satisfied. Under section 8(d) of the NLRA
mandatory subjects of bargaining are those pertaining to "wages, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment."153 In Silverman, the court found
that reserve/free agency systems are mandatory, not permissive, subjects of
bargaining.15 4
Finally, the last principle of Mackey is violated by Major League owners
because any restraint that the owners would implement absent a collective
bargaining agreement is not the part of a bonafide arm's length transaction as
required by Mackey.155 The players have indicated that there is absolutely no
possibility of them accepting any proposal of the owners that includes a salary
cap of any form.156
The Mackey test for determining whether a certain agreement is subject to
the nonstatutory exemption has been the test applied by the courts.
157
However, there comes a time in labor negotiations when the parties realize that
pension benefits and the right of players to individually negotiate their own salaries.
Mackey, 543 F.2d at 616. The district court found that no quid pro quo existed, and the
circuit court affirmed. Id. Furthermore, the union's acceptance of the status quo of the
Rozelle Rule in the initial collective bargaining agreements does not serve as to
immunize the Rule from antitrust scrutiny. Id.
151Id.
1521d. at 614.
1539 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1988).
l5 4 Silverman ex rel. NLRB, 880 F. Supp. 246, 256 (S.D. N.Y. 1995), afrd No. 95-6048,
1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 27744 (2d Cir. September 29, 1995).
155Mackey, 543 F.2d at 606.
156Jim Molony, Bagwell Calls Owners' Salary Cap "Slavery" Compared to Old System, THE
HOUSTON POST, Jan. 14, 1995, at Bl. Jeff Bagwell, player for the Houston Astros and
1994 National League Most Valuable Player, stated, "[tihis salary cap is not going to fly;
there's no way." Id.
157See Powell v. National Football League, 930 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
498 U.S. 1040 (1991); Bridgeman v. National Basketball Ass'n., 675 F. Supp. 960 (D.N.J.
1987); Brown v. Pro Football Inc., 782 F. Supp. 125 (D. D.C. 1991), rev'd, Brown v. Pro
Football Inc., 50 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1995); National Basketball Ass'n v. Williams, 857
F. Supp. 1069 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
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there is no longer a reasonable prospect of attaining a settlement. Thus, a
determination must be made as to whether the employer may implement a
plan without the consent of the union after the negotiations between the parties
have failed to produce a collective bargaining agreement.
The point at which there is no longer a reasonable prospect of attaining a
settlement is called an impasse. 158 In Bridgeman v. National Basketball Ass'n., the
court found that the moment at which the parties reach an impasse in their
negotiations is significant because an employer may then make unilateral
changes that are reasonably contained in the pre-impasse proposals.159 After
impasse, either party is free to decline to negotiate further.160 Therefore, under
Bridgeman, Major League Owners are permitted to unilaterally impose salary
cap proposals, or other player restraints, as long as the court agrees that an
impasse has occurred.161 However, the owners removed the salary cap because
they feared that the NLRB would sustain an unfair labor practice charge that
the players' union filed. 162 The players argue that the imposition of the salary
cap exhibits a bad faith negotiation on the part of the owners who implemented
the cap before an impasse had occurred. 163
Therefore, it becomes imperative for the courts to make a determination of
when an impasse occurs in the negotiation process. The Supreme Court defines
impasse as a temporary deadlock or break in negotiations which is eventually
broken, through either a change of mind or the application of economic
force.164 An impasse is a recurring feature in the bargaining process and one
which is not sufficiently destructive of group bargaining to justify unilateral
withdrawal.165
158 Bridgeman, 675 F. Supp. at 966.
1591d. See American Fed'n of Television and Radio Artists v. NLRB, 395 F.2d 622 (D.C.
Cir. 1968).
160Bridgeman, 675 F. Supp. at 966. See Cheney California Lumber Co. v. NLRB, 319
F.2d 375, 380 (9th Cir. 1963).
16 1See Powell v. National Football League, 930 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
498U.S. 1040 (1991); Bridgeman v. National Basketball Ass'n., 675 F. Supp. (D.NJ. 1987);
Brown v. Pro Football Inc., 782 F. Supp. 125 (D. D.C. 1991), rev'd, Brown v. Pro Football
Inc., 50 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1995); National Basketball Ass'n v. Williams, 857 F. Supp.
1069 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
162 Paul Hoynes, Baseball Owners Scrap Salary Cap, THE PLAIN DEALER, Feb. 4, 1995, at
Al.
1631d.
16 4Charles D. Bonanno Linen Service, Inc. v. NLRB, 454 U.S. 404 (1982). An impasse
may be brought about intentionally by one or both parties as a device to further the
bargaining process. Id. "Suspension of theprocess as a result of an impasse may provide
time for reflection and a cooling of tempers; it may be used to demonstrate the depth of
a party's commitment to a position taken in the bargaining; or it may increase economic
pressure on one or both sides, and thus increase the desire for agreement." Id.
16 5 ld.
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Under the NLRA, impasse exists when the parties have exhausted the
"prospects of concluding an agreement and further discussions would be
fruitless."166 The NLRB has summarized the factors to be considered in
determining if an impasse exists. They have stated that whether a bargaining
impasse has occurred is a matter of judgment.167 "The bargaining history, the
good faith of the parties in negotiations, the length of the negotiations, the
importance of the issue or issues as to which there is disagreement, the
contemporaneous understanding of the parties as to the state of negotiations,
are all relevant factors to be considered in deciding whether an impasse in
bargaining existed."168 Whether an impasse has occurred in the stalled baseball
negotiations will be left for a judicial determination.
D. Does the Exemption Expire with the Agreement?
If the courts determine that an impasse has occurred in the bargaining of
Major League Baseball owners and the players' union, the owners may have
legal justification to implement their own plan. However, a line of cases has
emerged finding that when the nonstatutory exemption ends, any collective
bargaining agreements may be subject to antitrust scrutiny.169 After the
expiration of a collective bargaining agreement, there may come a time in the
negotiations when the nonstatutory exemption ends and any restraints
imposed by the owners will be subject to antitrust scrutiny.170 The next part of
the analysis will discuss the various points at which the courts have seen fit to
end the exemption, the effects of removal of the nonstatutory exemption, and
a suggested solution to the problems.
In Bridgeman, the court addressed the issue of when the nonstatutory
exemption ends.171 The NBA argued that antitrust immunity continues after
166 Bridgeman, 675 F. Supp. at 966 n.5.
16 71d. at 966.
1681d. See Taft Broadcasting Co., 163 N.L.R.B. 475 (1967).
169Powell v. National Football League, 930 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498
U.S. 1040 (1991); Brown v. Pro Football Inc., 782 F. Supp. 125 (D. D.C. 1991), rev'd, Brown
v. Pro Football Inc., 50 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1995); National Basketball Ass'n v. Williams.,
857 F. Supp. 1069 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
170See Bridgeman v. National Basketball Ass'n, 675 F. Supp. 960 (D.N.J. 1987); see also
Taft Broadcasting, Inc., 163 N.L.R.B. 475 (1967).
l7lBridgeman, 675 F. Supp. at 966. The NBA players commenced their first challenge
on antitrust grounds in 1970 where they challenged, inter alia, the college player draft
and the reserve clause. Robertson v. National Basketball Ass'n., 389 F. Supp. 867
(S.D.N.Y. 1975). The parties reached a settlement agreement in 1976 which modified the
college player draft and the right of first refusal for free agents. Id. When this agreement
was adopted the owners and the players began collective bargaining and entered into
an agreement incorporating the provisions of the settlement. Id. This agreement expired
in 1979, and the parties entered a new agreement in 1980, that ran through 1982, and
the owners then sought the first time to introduce their salary cap to control team
payrolls in a financially struggling league. Bridgeman, 675 F. Supp. at 962. The players
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the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement as long as the league
continues to apply the player restrictions that were included in the previous
agreement.172 Under this argument, the owners could continue the status quo
until a new agreement can be reached. The players' union, on the other hand,
asserted that the nonstatutory exemption expires the moment the previous
collective bargaining agreement expires.173 The court rejected both the owners'
and the players' arguments and ruled that the restraints in a previous
agreement do not lose their antitrust exemption immediately upon expiration
of the collective bargaining agreement.174 The court believed that adopting the
players' approach would severely hinder the collective bargaining relationship
and be contrary to the purpose of the nonstatutory exemption.175
The court refused to adopt the position of the owners because of the federal
labor policy of favoring collective bargaining.176 The court found that, after the
expiration of a collective bargaining agreement, a point in time will come when
the restraints that were a part of a previous agreement can no longer be said to
exist because the exemption no longer applies to the expired agreement.177 The
court fails to articulate whether all the players in the league become free agents
after the nonstatutory exemption ends.
Bridgeman stated that the exemption for a certain restraint will continue only
as long as the employer continues to impose that restraint unchanged and
reasonably believes that the restraint or a close variation, will be incorporated
into the next collective bargaining agreement.178 When the employer has no
reasonable belief that the restraint will be incorporated into the next agreement,
the nonstatutory exemption for that restraint end, and the restraint can no
longer be considered the product of a bona fide arm's length transaction as
responded by filing a lawsuit that was later settled and the parties reached a new
collective bargaining agreement containing a salary cap that would remain in effect until
1987. Id. at 962-63. Following the expiration of this agreement, the players filed an unfair
labor practice charge with the NLRB and this lawsuit. Id.
172Bridgetnan, 675 F. Supp. at 964-65. The owners contend that the protection from the
antitrust laws afforded to the parties under the nonstatutory exemption should continue
to shield their player restraints from scrutiny under the antitrust laws. Id.
173d. at 964. The players contend that the expiration of the collectivebargaining brings
an end to the nonstatutory exemption because the players have not consented to any of
the restraints beyond the running of the collective bargaining agreement. Id. The players
point out that the courts have generally only applied the nonstatutory exemption when
the challenged practices are part of a collective bargaining agreement. Bridgeman, 965 F.
Supp. at 965. See also Smith v. Pro Football Inc., 420 F. Supp. 738,742 (D. D.C. 1976), affd
in part, rev'd in part, 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
174 Bridgeman, 675 F. Supp. at 965-66.
175Id. at 965.
176 d. at 966.
177 Bridgeman, 675 F. Supp. at %6.
178Id. at 967.
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required by Mackey.179 The restraint will then become subject to antitrust
attack.180
Applying Bridgeman to the negotiations in Major League Baseball leads one
to conclude that the owners unilateral implementation of a plan will not
withstand an antitrust attack by the players. The court makes clear, that only
those restraints included in the expired agreement will continue.181 The salary
cap, or any other restraint imposed by the owners that is not the part of any
previous collective bargaining agreement and represents a substantial new
restraint, cannot be considered part of a bona fide arm's length transaction. The
owners may continue to impose those restrictions on player movement that
were present in the previous collective bargaining agreement 182 until there is
no reasonable belief that they will become a part of the next collective
bargaining agreement.183
Some degree of restraint on player movement from team to team is virtually
certain to be included in any collective bargaining agreement. However,
Bridgeman articulates only one potential point at which to end the nonstatutory
exemption for a player restraint after the expiration of a collective bargaining
agreement. Subsequent decisions in other courts have taken the position that
the exemption continues past the point suggested in Bridgeman.1
84
Powell v. NFL forced the Eighth Circuit to decide when the nonstatutory
exemption ended after the expiration of the NFL collective bargaining
agreement.1 85 Here, the players attempted to argue that the exemption expires
179Id. at 967. If an employer then changes a restraint that was permitted under the
expired agreement, then the exemption ends until the new restraint is contained in a
new collective bargaining agreement. Id. It is of no consequence whether the owners
reasonably believe that this new restraint will be incorporated into the subsequent
collective bargaining agreement. Bridgeman, 675 F. Supp. at 967.
180The restraint will be subjected to the three part test adopted by the Eighth Circuit
in Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 614 (8th Cir. 1976).
181Bridgeman, 675 F. Supp. at %7.
182 See HEYLAR, supra note 14.
183 See Lafferty, supra note 27, at 1279. The owners clearly will not concede on this
reserve clause entirely and allow the players to become free agents immediately upon
the expiration of a contract and give up on the restraints they have fought for bitterly
in past labor disputes.
184 See Powell v. National Football League, 930 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
498 U.S. 1040 (1991); Brown v. Pro Football Inc., 782 F. Supp. 125 (D. D.C. 1991), rev'd,
Brown v. Pro Football Inc., 50 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
185powell, 930 F.2d at 1295. Nine former and current NFL players brought this antitrust
claim against the league and the owners to challenge the college draft and the league's
adherence to its uniform Player Contract restraints. Id. The owners and players entered
into a collective bargaining agreement in 1977 which contained a first
refusal/compensation system, whereby, a team had the option to match any offer one
of their players received. Id. This agreement ended in 1982 and was followed by a
fifty-seven day strike, after which a new agreement was entered into. Id. at 1296 This
new agreement then expired in 1987 and was followed by another strike over free agency
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when the parties reach an impasse in negotiations.186 The district court (Powell
I) agreed with the players and found that once the parties reach an impasse
concerning player restraints those restraints lose their immunity and further
imposition of those conditions may result in antitrust liability.187 However, the
Eighth Circuit (Powell II) found that the exemption did not expire provided
that a collective bargaining environment still existed. 188
The Powell II court recognized that when a collective bargaining relationship
exists, the remedies available to the players should come through the remedies
provided under labor law rather than antitrust law.189 To allow the players to
pursue an action for treble damages under the Sherman Act would undermine
the careful balance between antitrust and labor law established by Congress.190
Therefore, after a collective bargaining agreement expires, an employer is
under a duty to bargain with the union before making any unilateral changes
in the agreement. After the declaration of an impasse, an employer may make
unilateral changes that are reasonably connected to their pre-impasse
proposals. 91
The court held that as long as "there is a possibility that proceedings may be
commenced before the Board (National Labor Relations Board), or until final
resolution of Board proceedings and appeals therefrom, the labor relationship
continues and the labor exemption applies."192 Therefore, under Powell II, the
and other issues. Powell, 930 F.2d at 1296. The strike ended during the 1987 season
without a new agreement and the players filed this lawsuit. Id. The players attacked the
league's continued adherence to the expired 1982 collective bargaining agreement. Id.
1 86 Id. at 1296. The players asserted that the league's continued imposition of the
restraint of the first refusal/compensation system was not protected under the
nonstatutory exemption for antitrust violations because the exemption expired with the
expiration of the collective bargaining agreement. Powell, 930 F.2d at 12%.
1 87 Powell v. National Football League, 678F. Supp. 777, 789 (D. Minn. 1988). The court
recognized the fact that the restraint must still violate the Sherman Act. Id.
188Powell, 930 F.2d at 1303-04.
1891d. at 1301. The Supreme Court has recognized that disputes over employment
terms and conditions are not the central focus of the Sherman Act. Id. See Associated
Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 469 U.S. 519,539-40
(1983).
19OPowell, 930 F.2d at 1302.
191Id.
1921d. at 1303-04 (emphasis added). The court noted that this does not mean that once
the parties enter into a collective bargaining agreement that management if forever
exempt from the antitrust laws. Id. at 1303. However, this holding does appear to
demonstrate that employers will be given a great deal of latitude in imposing restraint
as long as a collective bargaining relationship is maintained, even absent an agreement.
The court quoted a previous decision stating that sometimes national labor policy
should override antitrust policy. Powell, 930 F.2d at 1296. See Continental Maritime of
San Francisco v. Pacific Coast Metal Trades Dist. Council, 817 F.2d 1391, 1393 (9th Cir.
1987).
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nonstatutory labor exemption continues until there is no longer any possibility
of proceedings before the NLRB.193
Powell differs greatly from Bridgeman. Under Powell, a new restraint
unilaterally imposed by the owners may survive an antitrust claim. 194 If the
owners can successfully establish that they reached an impasse at any time,
they can legitimately impose a new restraint on the players under Powell 11.195
Thus, by extending the nonstatutory exemption until there is no longer any
hint of a bargaining relationship, the Eighth Circuit recognized that the labor
policies completely supersede antitrust laws in collective bargaining
relationships. There would be virtually no opportunity to ever assert an
antitrust claim in the collective bargaining environment. Under a literal
interpretation of Powell, the Major League Baseball players' union would not
be able to bring any antitrust claims without first decertifying the union to
break the collective bargaining relationship. Powell forecloses the players'
union's opportunity to pursue an antitrust claim, thereby removing a vital
bargaining weapon in the union's somewhat limited arsenal.
In National Basketball Ass'n v. Williams, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit ruled on an attack by the NBA players against the player
restraints in the NBA. 196 The court affirmed the decision of the district court
stating that the antitrust laws have no application in collective bargaining
negotiations between the owners and players.197 The circuit court followed
Powell II and found that the nonstatutory exemption continues as long as a
collective bargaining relationship exists between the parties.198 Furthermore,
even if the antitrust laws did apply, the restraints challenged by the
players-the college draft, right of first refusal, and the salary cap-survive
antitrust scrutiny under the rule of reason test.199
The court examined the issue of whether the antitrust laws prohibit
employers from acting jointly in a multiemployer bargaining unit with the
union.200 Labor laws exhibit an intent on the part of Congress to permit
multiemployer bargaining units to bargain hard with unions and use economic
force to resolve disputes over terms and conditions of employment. 201
193Powell, 678 F. Supp. at 789.
194pojell, 930 F.2d at 1302.
195 d.
196 National Basketball Ass'n, 45 F.3d at 684.
197Y.
198 d. at 686.
1991d. at 685.
20 0National Basketball Ass'n, 45 F.3d at 688.
201Id. Multiemployer bargaining has been a feature of collective bargaining since the
beginning and that to now hold it illegal would cause a massive change to collective
bargaining. Id. at691. Congress expressly considered themultiemployerbargaining unit
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Therefore, the antitrust laws cannot be used to prevent multiemployer
bargaining units.
The court rejected the claim by the players because doing so would prevent
employers in all industries from jointly bargaining hard with a common
union.202 Furthermore, under the players interpretation of the law, if after an
expiration of an agreement, a group of employers were to agree to seek to limit
wage increases to five percent while the union demanded ten percent, the
employers could shield themselves from antitrust liability only by granting the
ten percent raise.203
This holding is a tremendous victory for the NBAowners as well as the Major
League Baseball owners. Under Powell 11, and now Williams, the owners may
enforce player restraints even if the antitrust exemption is removed. These
decisions render the antitrust exemption for baseball virtually meaningless
with respect to labor relations. The owners are no longer required to justify the
player restraints on the antitrust exemption, provided that a collective
bargaining relationship with the players still exists. Under Williams, the owners
can continue to impose the restraints contained in the previous collective
bargaining agreements, along with the new restraints.
Even a congressional or judicial removal of the antitrust exemption from
baseball would not permit the players' union to challenge the salary cap or any
other player restraints under the antitrust laws. The players sole remedy is
provided in federal labor laws. Both sides filed charges with the NLRB alleging
that the other side has committed unfair labor practices by not bargaining in
good faith.204 On March 31,1995, United States District Judge Sonia Sotomayor
ruled in favor of the players and granted an injunction that restored the terms
of the previous collective bargaining agreement.205
and concluded that it should be allowed. Id. See NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local Union
No. 449,353 U.S. 87, 95-96 (1957).
2021d. at 692.
2 031d. at 693.
204See Silverman v. NLRB, 880 F. Supp. 246 (S.D. N.Y. 1995), affd No. 95-6048, 1995
U.S. App. LEXIS 27744 (2d Cir. September 29,1995). The players alleged that the owners
violated Sections 8(a)(1) and (5) of the NLRA by unilaterally eliminating, before an
impasse had been reached, salary arbitration for certain players, competitive bargaining
for certain free agents, and the anti-collusion provision of their collective bargaining
agreement. Id. at 250.
2051d. Judge Sotomayor ruled that the Owners had violated Sections 8(a)(1) and (5) of
the NLRA by unilaterally eliminating, before an impasse had been reached, salary
arbitration, competitive bargaining for free agents, and the anti-collusion provision of
their collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 250. Essential in her holding was the finding
that the subjects of bargaining, reserve/free agency system, were mandatory, not
permissive subjects of bargaining. Silverman at 256.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Over the past seventy-four years, Major League Baseball has enjoyed a
unique exemption from antitrust laws that no other professional sport enjoys.
At one time this exemption served a purpose by providing the game of baseball
with stability. This need, however, is absent in today's game. Baseball has
evolved into a large industry and no longer needs any protection from the
federal government. It should be subjected to the same laws that other
industries face. The initial rationale for the exemption, the fact that baseball
was not interstate commerce, evaporated with the Flood decision in 1972.206
While our judicial system is based on stare decisis, when the basis for a decision
no longer exists, the decision should be overturned and the law brought up to
date to meet the demands of a fluid society.
One thing has remained obvious in the seventy-four years since the Federal
Baseball decision: The Supreme Court has absolutely no desire to reverse the
decision. The Court believes that this is a task for Congress. It is now time for
Congress to step up to the plate and recognize that the business of baseball
should no longer be shielded from antitrust laws. The owners claim that the
game would collapse with the removal of the exemption is difficult to swallow
considering the enormous success of both the NFL and the NBA.
The effect of a removal of the antitrust exemption will be more symbolic than
substantive.207 This is due to the labor laws of this country and the collective
bargaining environment that those laws promote. Once a collective bargaining
relationship is established between the employers and employees, the legal
ramifications irrevocably change.208 Since the formation of the players' union,
the owners and the players must reach collective bargaining agreements.
Therefore, unless a dispute arises, any restraints on players must come through
the collective bargaining process rather than unilateral implementation by the
owners.
It is now time for a removal of the antitrust exemption from baseball to
correct an anomaly that has been in existence for seventy-four years. A removal
of the exemption, however, is not the panacea that the players' union thinks it
is. Granted, a removal of the exemption would allow the players to bring a
lawsuit for antitrust violations. The courts, however, have expressed their belief
that the collective bargaining process and the federal labor laws take precedent
over antitrust laws.209 Therefore, any restraints on player movement that are
206Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
207However, that symbolism may prove to be enough to get the players to end their
strike and begin playing baseball again. See Baseball, THE PLAIN DEALER, Feb. 11, 1995,
at D4. Donald Fehr, the leader of the players' union, indicated that if Congress were to
repeal the antitrust exemption the players would be back on the field this season. Id.
208Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 50 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
209 See Powell v. National Football League, 930 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
498 U.S. 1040 (1991); National Basketball Ass'n v. Williams, No. 94-7709,1995 U.S. App.
LEXIS 1531 (2d Cir. Jan. 24, 1995).
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the product of a collective bargaining process will not be subject to antitrust
law. The one area where a removal of the exemption may assist the players is
when the owners unilaterally impose conditions that have not been the part of
a previous collective bargaining agreement. The players could then bring an
antitrust lawsuit against the owners and any restraint imposed would be
subject to therule of reason test for antitrust violations.
One other issue must also be resolved: When should the nonstatutory
exemption that applies to collective bargaining agreements expire? The owners
will attempt to establish that the exemption continues until a new agreement
is reached, while the players will counter that the exemption expires with the
agreement. To meet labor law's goal of promoting collective bargaining
agreements, the nonstatutory exemption should continue after the expiration
of an agreement.
This note proposes that the nonstatutory exemption should continue into
the future until it becomes unreasonable to believe that any restraint in the old
agreement will become part of a new agreement.210 This policy of extending
the exemption gives both sides the motivation to reach a new collective
bargaining agreement and prevents the chaos that would follow if the
exemption ended with the agreement. Extending the nonstatutory exemption
would give the players motivation to negotiate and reach a new agreement
rather than simply letting the previous agreement expire. The owners would
also be motivated to reach a new agreement knowing they could not continue
any particular restraint in perpetuity.
A removal of the nonstatutory exemption when the collective bargaining
agreement expires would allow the players to bring an antitrust suit against
the owners. Allowing the players protection under the Sherman Act would
disrupt the balance of power and give the players a powerful new weapon to
assert at the bargaining table.211 The players would be empowered at the
bargaining table and would be able to threaten the owners with an antitrust
suit. The players could then use that leverage to obtain a more favorable
settlement. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit articulated this position for the extension of the nonstatutory exemption
recently and stated that injecting antitrust liability into the process for resolving
disputes between employers and employees would have the effect of both
subverting national labor policy and exaggerating antitrust concerns. 212
21OSee Corcoran, supra note 111, at 1075. This note takes a similar position and believes
that extending the exemption until it is unreasonable to believe that any prior restraint
will be the part of any new agreement best effectuates the policy of promoting collective
bargaining agreements. Id.
211Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 50 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1995). In this decision the D.C.
Circuit denied the NFL players claim for damages for violations of the Sherman Act and
held that when antitrust law and labor law collide the antitrust law must give way. Id.
at 1056.
212Id.
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Therefore, allowing the continuation of the nonstatutory exemption is the best
means to effectuate national labor policy and to keep the a level playing field.
After the disastrous events in the fall of 1994, the players and owners finally
realized that the game was bigger than their problems and that it needed to
continue with or without a collective bargaining agreement. The 1995 season
was played and finished with the Atlanta Braves' dramatic victory over the
Cleveland Indians in the first World Series since 1993, showing once again that
nothing is wrong with the game of baseball as it is played between the white
lines. Baseball was able to heal many scars with its exciting 1995 season. Many
problems, however, do persist and will not be solved until the players and
owners can come to the bargaining table and finally agree to a new long term
collective bargaining agreement.
BRIAN F ZECK
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